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100 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care

State of Blacks in the NYPD 2004

Annual Report on the Commissioner

"The Police Department, from the lowest rank right up to the highest rank, is a good example of what can be done. "Mayor Bloomberg's quote in response to diversity in city governmental agencies. NY Newsday 2/17/04

91% of NYPD uniformed personnel in the rank of captain or above are caucation.


“100 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care” conducts an annual review of the New York City Police Commissioner.  The analysis is an examination of how the policies of the present administration addresses issues that impact on the African-American police officer as well as the communities of color within New York City.  100 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care’s annual “State of Blacks in The NYPD” report is broken down into six areas as follows: 


Each area is issued a letter grade from “A” to “F” (A being the best and “F” the worst) based on the organization’s analysis of the Police Commissioner’s successes or failures.  At the beginning of each section the letter grade is stated followed by a list of bullet points highlighting the grade.   The section is then concluded with a brief synopsis explaining each bullet point and the resulting grade. 


Two years after Raymond Kelly was appointed Police Commissioner there continues to be a void of diversity in the command staff (Captain and above) of the NYPD.  Blacks have been all but removed from the policy making decisions in the following areas: 

No Black Executives assigned to the following areas of the NYPD 

            LOCATION                                      # OF POTENTIAL ASSIGNMENTS

 Detective Bureau                                                 21 positions         

Detective Borough Manhattan                              10 positions

Detective Borough Queens                                    06 positions

Detective Borough Brooklyn                                  05 positions

Detective Borough Bronx                                       06 positions

Counter Terrorism Bureau                                     06 positions

Intelligence Division                                              09 positions

Special Operations Division                                    10 positions

Traffic Control Division                                          20 positions

1st DC office or subunits*                                       12 positions

DC of Legal Matters or subunits                               09 positions

DC of Operations Office or subunits                         03 positions

DC of Management and Budget or subunits              17 positions

DC of Technology and Development                        13 positions

DC of Strategic Analysis and Planning (OMAT)          13 positions

Total Positions                                                         174

No Black Commanders assigned to the following Bureaus or commands


            LOCATION                          # OF POTENTIAL ASSIGNMENTS

Patrol Borough Commanders                07 positions

Transit Bureau*                                    04 positions

Transit Borough Manhattan                  14 positions

Transit Borough Bronx                          08 positions

Transit Borough Queens                        07 positions

Transit Borough Brooklyn                      13 positions


Housing Borough Manhattan                  09 positions

Housing Borough Bronx/ Queens             09 positions

Housing Borough Brooklyn                      07 positions


PBQN                                                     23 positions

PBQS**                                                   25 positions

PBBS***                                                   38 positions

PBSI                                                       12 positions

PBMS*****                                                 32 positions

PBBX                                                       34 positions

Transportation Bureau -

Support Services Bureau                         13 positions

Criminal Justice Bureau                          09 positions

MISD                                                       __________

Total Assignments                                  264


*Transit Bureau has one Black Deputy Inspector

**During our review one Black CO was assigned to PBQS precinct

***During our review Deputy Chief James Secreto was assigned to PBBS

      (A Black captain was assigned here during the Louima incident but was never promoted to CO, although other white captains were promoted over him.)

*****PBMS has never in the history of the NYPD had a Black CO assigned to any of its precincts.

Lack of African-Americans assigned to Precinct Squad Commander positions



Detective Borough Manhattan        22 positions -  1 Black assigned           

Detective Borough Brooklyn            23 positions -  1 Black assigned

Detective Borough Queens             16 positions -  0 Blacks assigned

Detectives Staten Island                  3 positions -             0 Blacks

Detective Borough Bronx                 12 positions -  0 Blacks assigned

Total Assignments                           73 positions - 2 Blacks assigned

**There is no Detective Borough in Staten Island.

(Patrol Borough Staten Island supervises its own Detective Operations, which oversees detective squads in each of that borough's three police precincts).

Lack of Black Executive representation in special training and assignments 

-No Black Unit Head in charge of any Borough or Bureau Investigation Unit

-No Black Executive assigned to an active role in the Republican National Convention

-Lack of Black representation for the upcoming Olympic planning

-Lack of Black Executive assigned to Police Management Institute training*

-Lack of Black applicants assigned to external specialized training such as:

-FBI Academy

          -Educational Scholarships



                                              Number of       Number of                  Number of

UNIT                                       Positions         Blacks assigned            Whites assigned


CHIEF DEPT S.A. SECT.             009                         000                           007

DD BS HOM.  T/F                      018                         000                           017

DISORDER CONTROL                  012                         000                           011

GANG SQ. S.I.                            017                         000                           015

PBQS ANTI CRIME*                    

PBSI ANTI CRIME                        015                         000                           014

S.I. DA SQUAD                           015                         000                           014

NARC BORO S.I.                         025                         000                           021


PBBS ANTI CRIME*                     017                         001                           015            

PBQN ANTI CRIME*                    014                         001                           011

BOMB SQUAD                             036                         001                           035

DD QNS. HOM. T/F                      031                         001                           026

GANG SQ. BS                              


AVIATION UNIT                           061                         002                           053

PBMS ANTI CRIME*                      029                         002                           020


CANINE TEAM                             045                         003                           034              

GANG SQ. BN                              035                         003                           029

GANG SQ. QNS                            035                         003                           024

HWY DISTRICT                          


GANG DIVISION                          040                         004                           032

INTELL PUB. SECURITY              058                         004                           046


AUTO CRIME                               111                        005                           095 


HARBOR UNIT                            173                         006                           154

JOINT TERRORIST T/F                136                         006                           113


FIREARMS TACTICS                      149                         007                           119


CITYWIDE ESU                              482                        046                           388


HWY UNIT 1- 5 (TOTAL)                324                     048                           258

*Formerly the Street Crime Unit.  The Street Crime unit had a history of excluding minority officers.

In addition to the above data, the poor grade issued in this area also took into account the following information:
-Proposed termination of promotional exam eligibility every two years
-Practice of one discretionary promotion of Black Executive uniformed member at a time 
-Failure to routinely send ranking Black members to PMI training
-Regulating Black ranking members to non-policy making positions
-Failure to assign Black Captains to precinct commands as XO or CO
-Failure to assign the only black female captain on patrol to XO or CO position
-Failed to use discretionary promotion of detectives from narcotics/gun unit
-Failure to diversity all units within the NYC Police Department
-Lack of a clear career promotional path for members in the ranks of Detective 

-Lack of representation for African-Americans in the skilled civilian workforce 

-Placement of low level white supervisors over ranking members of the Traffic Enforcement Division

-Refusal to fill DCCA position that historically was held by a minority 


Commissioner Kelly has failed to use his office to ensure that diversity is of paramount importance to the missions and goals of the NYC Police Department.  Although he has made a few ceremonial promotions, he has not used his discretionary powers to appoint qualified African-Americans to policy making positions.  Although civil service controls the manner in which a member of service is promoted in the rank structure, it does not control how the Commissioner uses his discretionary powers to appoint Unit heads and Deputy Commissioners.  Ranking Black members have also been kept out of the planning, implementation and operations of prestigious projects such as the Republican National Convention and proposed upcoming Olympics.  On paper Blacks have been indicated as being part of these committees, but in practice they are left out of the planning and implementation stages.  These assignments offer a vast amount of opportunity to network and expand one’s technological abilities. 

Commissioner Kelly has failed to continuously send a Black representative to the prestigious Police Management Institute.  The course has been offered to those members who are chosen to eventually serve in the higher executive command structure.  Under Commissioner Kerik two Blacks were chosen to attend during one cycle.  Under Commissioner Kelly, no Blacks were chosen for the previous cycle.  It was not until reports of this review were to be released that his administration decided in the final hours to send one Black Executive representative during the current cycle.    

In the area of patrol assignments Commissioner Kelly has not assigned one Black ranking member to the role of Borough Commander.  The only Black female Captain on patrol has not been designated to become an Executive Officer which is historically a prerequisite to becoming a Precinct Commanding Officer. 

The effect of Commissioner Kelly's lack of inclusion is also felt in agencies that were absorbed by the NYC Police Department.  During his two years in office he has placed mid level white male police supervisors over the black ranking members of the Traffic Enforcement Division. 

Detectives assigned as undercovers to the Narcotics and Firearms unit are not issued grade promotions in comparison to the level of danger that their assignments bring.  After the deaths of Detective Rodney Andrews and Detective James Nemorin left the front pages of the daily tabloids, Commissioner Kelly returned to business as usual of having officers of color doing the most dangerous assignments with the least rewards.  Although Blacks make up a significant number of detectives they are not represented in the managerial level of the Detective Bureau.  In the entire city, there are only two Black Squad Commanders out of the 76 Precinct Detective Squads.

The most telling area of Commissioner Kelly’s lack of concern for future improvement in diversifying the ranks of the police department is in his decision to terminate examination established promotion eligibility every two years.  This will have a disproportionate impact on the future of Black supervisors.  He made this decision without any empirical data that shows the cancellation of examination based eligibility will benefit the police department's supervisory ranks.  When Commissioner Kelly was questioned about the lack of precinct commanders, he responded by stating “the root of the issue is that some officers are not studying for advancement.  The department has only 11 black officers at the rank of captain or above.  I urge anyone in the department to study for promotion.  We just don't have enough minorities now."   

Commissioner Kelly made these comments knowing that terminating the promotional list after two years will result in disqualifying Black candidates who have "studied."  An examination of the current captain list of 275 potential captains shows the  following in regards to minority candidates: 



RACE                            LIST# 1 – 137            LIST #138-275

Male Black                              1                                  3

Female Black                          0                                  3

Male Hispanic                         6                                  9

Female Hispanic                     2                                  3

Male Asian                              1                                  2

Female Asian                           0                                  0

Female White                          5                                  4

The above Captains eligibility list is broken down into two areas.  The first area list numbers 1 – 137 are the number of captains eligible to be promoted under Commissioner Kelly’s two year eligibility plan.  The second area list numbers 138 – 275, will be excluded under the Commissioner’s plans.  The ethnic demographic breakdown clearly shows that the Commissioner Kelly plan will continue the systemic exclusion of people of color from the position of Captain.  

This brief analysis shows that if in fact the Commissioner’s plans are carried out, the only three Black females on the captain list will not be promoted. Only one African-American will be promoted from the entire civil service list.  As it currently stands there are only two African-American female captains.   

It should be noted that the men and women on any promotional list are the top scorers in their rank.  For example the 275 potential Captains on the current list were the best out of the potential 1716 eligible Lieutenants.  This current list has the largest number of minority eligibles in the history of the NYPD.  It was only the last Captain’s exam that the first Female Hispanic was promoted to the rank of captain.  She was promoted at the fourth year level of the list.  If the Commissioner Kelly’s plan was in place then, we would still be without a Hispanic Captain.    

The Commissioner is making the decision to turn the traditional four year eligibility list into two years with the knowledge that 91% of NYPD uniformed personnel in the rank of Captain and above are Caucasians.   Historically the Captain’s exam was allowed to run the full four year life of the list. 

Commissioner Kelly is making this decision without any empirical data that shows it would benefit the overall running of the department.  It would in fact have an immediate negative impact on years of attempts to diversify the police department’s command staff.   

An additional area of concern is the civilian skilled workforce ranks.  Although African-Americans make up the majority of the civilian strength of the NYPD, they are under represented in the skilled labor pool.     


Ethnic Breakdown of Civilian Workforce


 Skilled Workers


                                                Black               White               Hispanic         Other

Civilian Workforce                   9864                  3200                3379                697

      57.1%                  18.9%              19.9%              4.1% 


Skilled Craft workers                55                      363                  62                    33

                                               10.7%                70.8%              12.1%               6.4% 

Analysis of the Traffic Enforcement Division 

One area that is alarming is how the Police Commissioner handled the merger of Traffic Enforcement Agents.  A review of the aftermath of this action shows that Commissioner Kelly has little or no confidence in Black managers’ ability to handle duties that they historical have handled well.  The managerial rank of the Traffic Enforcement Division structure prior to the merger was as follows: 


-Deputy Chief

-Assistant Chief




Many of the above titles were held by people of color.  The Traffic Enforcement Division has historically been one of the only law enforcement agencies that was predominantly ran by people of color and many of them were women.  Throughout the years they have been very successful at managing this largely minority city agency.  Commissioner Kelly’s administration rewarded them by completely revamping the rank structure and, in the process, denying them upwardly mobility.  The new rank structure is following: 

            -Deputy Inspector (NYPD member)


            -Deputy Director

            -Captain (NYPD member)


            -Lieutenant (NYPD member)





An analysis of the new managerial hierarchy chart shows that Commissioner Kelly creatively undermined the authority of Traffic managers by placing a NYPD Deputy Inspector over the entire unit and then infusing NYPD Captains, Lieutenants and Sergeants over the existing Traffic Enforcement managerial staff.  This is an unprecedented move that completely circumvented the overwhelming existing minority managerial staff and, in the process, neutralized their decision making abilities.  This action has also created a glass ceiling where there is little or no upward movement.

Police Commissioner Kelly has carried out several actions that have hurt morale in the New York City Police Department.

-Recent independent study showed 68% of NYPD supervisors, detectives and police officers believed morale declined under Police Commissioner Kelly

-Officers are continually told that they are not doing a good job by their supervisors in spite of the decrease in crime

-PBA's vote of no confidence for the Police Commissioner reflects the overall atmosphere within the precincts

-Precincts are in poor physical conditions

-Precincts lack the basic supplies needed to perform routine police duties

-Officers were punished by being transferred for not following NYPD's quota system

-Union representatives had their parking permits removed because they spoke on behalf of those transferred members.

-Failure to come to the defense of Emergency Dispatch Operators during boating accident

-Refusal to address repeated complaints from School Safety Agents regarding lack of equipment and contradictory departmental policies. 

-Abuse of Performance Monitoring Program


The most telling sign that morale has fallen since the departure of Police Commissioner Kerik is the outcome of an independent survey that was reported in the New York Daily News on June 14th 2003.  In the report 68% of the officers interviewed stated that they believed moral declined under Police Commissioner Kelly.  Unlike the caring, concerned approach that previous Commissioner Bernard Kerik displayed for his men and women in uniform, Commissioner Kelly has not shown that concern.  Many commanders feel as though they have reached a glass ceiling as they are held in the position of precinct commanders for long periods of time.  Under Commissioner Kelly, there has been very little movement on the precinct level due to his slow micro managed approach of the current administration. 

The precinct fix up program that was initiated under the previous commissioner was abandoned and many precincts have had to contend with rodent infested work locations.  In many worksites there is a shortage of cleaners that lead to large amounts of garbage and rest rooms left unclean throughout the entire weekend. 

Civilian and uniformed members assigned to clerical duties are not issued the basic supplies needed to carry out normal record keeping functions.  

Police Officers feel that they have been relegated to 'quota cops'.  There continues to be a reckless push to achieve 'performance goals' on the backs of the citizenry.  This leaves the average patrol officer in an unenviable position; disliked by the public and unappreciated by management. 

Many officers have been placed in the Performance Monitoring Program for no other reason than that they have not met the Police Department predetermined quotas. 

The recent no confidence vote by the Patrolman Benevolent Association signified the overall sentiment that police officers have towards Commissioner Kelly's administration.  As the largest union representing the rank and file officer, the PBA made this decision based on the climate that has been created by Commissioner Kelly.  Although the "not justified" comment was mentioned in their no confidence vote, it was not the sole reason for the vote.  There were series of morale depleting actions by the Police Commissioner that led to this posture by the PBA's leadership and members. 

The falling morale has also effected how the police department is adjusting to the merger of School Safety Agents.  Members assigned to protect our schools have not had their repeated calls for better equipment and clarity in department rules addressed.  Commissioner Kelly's lack of response has left the Agents no other choice but to take to the streets and demonstrate their lack of confidence in his leadership.

Commissioner Kelly has failed to address the glaring racial imbalance in the New York City Police Department's disciplinary system as follows:

-Refusal to conduct and audit how discipline is issued along racial lines

-Refusal to ensure that penalties issued are standardized regardless of race

-Refusal to use his office as the final determining body to correct unfair trial room decisions

-Failure to issue harsh discipline to white officers involved in criminal behavior


On February 1, 2004 the Latino Officers Association announced the details of their class action law suit that was settled with the New York City Police Department.  The basis of the law suit was that Black and Latino officers were disciplined at a disproportionate rate in comparison to their white counterparts during the periods of 1996-1999. 

Although these periods do not impact on the time frame that Police Commissioner Kelly was heading the department, many of the policies and practices that were in place are still in place under his leadership.  When we met with Commissioner Kelly on June 13, 2002 we raised the disparate discipline problems and made a request for him to conduct an in depth study on the role race plays in departmental discipline from the command level all the way through to the trial room.  One year and eight months later Commissioner Kelly has not moved any closer to conducting that study or correcting the problems that plague the disciplinary process. 

100 Blacks in Law Enforcement sent out their questionnaire to various members of the department to determine if there were any announced improvements with the department's internal disciplinary process.  To our dismay our survey showed that members of the department from the rank of police officer to captain were being disciplined at a higher rate then their white counterparts.

Several cases were of special concern to us.  One involved a white probationary Lieutenant that openly assaulted a handcuffed prisoner in open view of officers at the front desk.  Although several officers came forwarded and reported the Lieutenant's actions, he was not demoted or arrested.  His penalty was several days' suspension and one year probation, the same form of penalty that was issued to a 17 year Black female detective after being charged with discourtesy to a supervisor. 

Other cases that were flagged by our survey included a white captain that was found guilty of leaking information regarding an internal investigation yet he was allowed to be promoted.  He then subsequently was allowed to retire while additional charges were pending against him.  This was occurring while a Hispanic Captain was not allowed to retire even though there were less serious charges pending against him.  

These were only a couple of examples of how there was a presence of unfair treatment in the disciplinary process from command level up to and including the department trial room.  To date Commissioner Kelly has not taken any substantial steps towards correcting these actions. His cosmetic appointment of an African-American in the Department Advocate office is futile without a complete overhaul of the entire system.  It took a class action law suit for the Commissioner to recognize that. 


Police Commissioner Kelly failed to improve in the area of recruitment for the following reasons:

-No innovative effort to implement a diversity recruitment drive

-Failure to reach out to non traditional organizations for assistance in recruitment drive

-Unwillingness to include non traditional methods of dispensing financial resources to improve recruitment drive

-Failure to conduct a study to determine the necessity for college requirements to become a police officer.

-Violating the Memorandum of Understanding put in place after the merger of School Safety and Traffic Enforcement officers in regards to career advancement

-Using bloated recruitment numbers to give the appearance of success

-Failed to give analysis for Ivy League school recruitment strategy.



 The New York City recruitment diversity effort is cloaked in lies and distortions.  In many cases the Police Commissioner has issued bloated numbers to indicate a successful drive.  When the numbers are scrutinized it is easy to determine that the drives have been total failures.  The department boasts that Since December 2003,  31,770 people have applied for the recent NYC Police Officer Exams.  They believe this is a vast improvement from the dismal and embarrassing 3,323 who filed for the exam in June of 2003.  According to the Commissioner's statements this improvement occurred because of his decision to drop the $35.00 fee that was previously charged to take the exam. 

What Police Commissioner Kelly has failed to mentioned is that in February of 2003 fewer than 4,000 of the over 14, 000 people who signed up for the exam actually showed up to take the test.  Additionally, out of the praised 31,770 potential applicants, only 19,000 actually called and reserved a seat to even take the exam.   

Recently the NYPD claimed success due to the turnout of 10,761 people who took the exam on Feb. 20 and 21.  Deputy Chief George Anderson stated “things are looking up.”  Apparently ‘up’ is a relative term to the NYPD.  The fact still remained that of the over 31,770 people who applied to take the exam, only 16,547 even reserved a seat.  Based on the normal course of recruitment and retention, the ‘success’ will be the actual hiring of a mere 10% of those who actually take the exam, approximately 1,654 people.  If the pattern of hiring continues, then the number of African-Americans will be an insignificant number of those actually hired.  Given the dismal rate of return, the recruitment effort is not even cost effective.  

In spite of these poor figures the police department has refused to reinstitute a successful program approved by former Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik.  The program was in conformity with the Memorandum of Understanding that was signed during the merger.  It called for the implementation of a career advancement incentive for School Safety Agents and Traffic Enforcement Agents.  Commissioner Kerik's plan called for a college waiver incentive for employees of both agencies after a two year successful stint in their agencies.  Commissioner Kelly removed this program without warning.  It should be noted that the School Safety Division and the Traffic Enforcement Division are two agencies that have an employee staff that is 81% Black and Hispanics.


Ethnic Breakdown of Traffic Enforcement Agents & School Safety Officers


Black              Hispanic         White              Other

                 57.3%              24.5%               14.0%               4.2%

 Both agencies are currently under the control of the New York City Police Department.    Although Commissioner Kelly removed the college wavier for these predominantly minority agencies, he allowed it to remain for those in military service. It should be noted that School Safety Agents and Traffic Enforcement Agents are trained by the NYPD to interact with the public in a non-lethal manner, whereas the Military is trained to use lethal force. 

The Commissioner also received an asterisk in this area due to his failure to give a fair analysis of the cost success ratio in regards to the Ivy League school recruitment initiative.  A large sum of manpower and revenue was used to go outside the city and target Ivy League schools.  A report must be generated to determine if this initiative was cost effective.   As of today no such report has been made public.   There appear to be a strong possibility that this endeavor was a complete waste of taxpayer’s resources.   

On all accounts the recruitment process has been a complete failure.

POLICE ENFORCEMENT           -    Grade   (C )*  

Commissioner Kelly receives a “C” in this area with an asterisk.  His actions in the area of police enforcement and addressing the terrorist threat are based on the following:

-Unsuccessful transition from the success of former Commissioner Bratton's crime fighting strategies and initiatives

-Abuse of crime fighting strategies Operation Impact and Operation Atlas

-Abuse of Warrant initiative

-Abuse of summons enforcement

-Abuse of UF 250's (Stop Question and Frisk forms) 

-Failure to terminate summons quota system

-Questionable successful in terrorist crime fighting strategy 

-Failure to implement comprehensive terrorist training program for uniform officers

-Successful handling of large crowds at non-confrontational events

-Limited success at handling large crowds at challenging peaceful events, i.e. war rally


 The Police Commissioner’s grade is based on several variables.  We looked at the seven major crimes that are used by the FBI to indicate the success or failure of crime fighting initiatives.  

Our comprehensive review of the Police Commissioner in this area shows that he has failed to follow the successful trend first implemented by Commissioner Bratton and followed by his predecessors.  By using crafty crime recording methods the police department has given the appearance that crime is continuing to drop, but there remains a question mark whether in fact it is true.  

The repeated accusations from groups such as the PBA that Police Department is mis-classifying crimes to give lower numbers should be accurately investigated by an external body to determine if this in fact is true.  This could be accomplished by calling in all precinct crime analysis personnel and questioning them under oath to determine the role in crime classification.  The external investigator should also conduct an audit to determine the legitimacy in the number of crime re-classifications.    

Even by NYPD records the homicide rate has in fact increased.  And that is the Homicide rate citywide for the two year crime periods.  Police stats show that the number of homicides for this time frame increased by 15.3%.    This trend appears to be more so in the African-American community where Homicide is on the increase.  

It has been incorrectly interpreted that because crime is down that all communities are living safer.  The fact is that crime can be down in one area of the city but up in other locations.   A review of crime by precinct shows that 40% of the total numbers of precincts are showing an increase in crime.   


PRECINCT                                        % INCREASE

          010                                                34.43  

070                                                15.92

107                                                14.45

018                                                13.77

112                                                13.27

          026                                                12.98

          090                                                12.53

          006                                                 12.12

          017                                                 11.14

          063                                                 10.06

          009                                                  9.90

          030                                                  9.01

          120                                                  8.90

          050                                                  7.80

          068                                                   7.50

          073                                                   6.89

          069                                                   6.12

          040                                                   5.85

          034                                                   5.57

         114                                                    4.95

         019                                                    3.83

         066                                                    2.91

         111                                                    2.70

        115                                                      2.65

         079                                                     2.55

         076                                                     2.34

         075                                                     2.11

         033                                                     1.74

         072                                                      1.69

         044                                                      0.67

         067                                                      0.53

 The above listed precinct increases in crime still does not show the true crime picture.   A particular precinct may not be on this list because the overall total of crime is down (total of 7 majors), but in one of the particular crime area there could be an increase.  For instance a precinct can be down in Grand Larcenies but up in robberies and rapes.  In several areas of the city this holds true.  For instance Patrol Borough Queens South is down overall in crime, but has an increase in the number of murders, rapes, and burglaries. 


Crime Increases By Borough Command


PBBN              PBQN             PBQS              PBMS             PBBX              PBSI

Murder           Burglary          Murder             Rape              Murder            Rape

Rape                                    Rape                G. Larc.                            Robbery

Fel. Aslt                               Burglary                                                       Fel. Aslt.


G. Larc.



It is not enough to use simple stats as indicators of public safety when there are several communities that are still showing a substantial number of predatory crimes.   

One troubling form of record keeping “slight of hand” is the ignoring of all crime that occurred on February 29th.  This is a crime fighting record keeping trick to use the leap year as an excuse to not account for crime on this date.  We believe the Police Department  should give dual reports during this period to account for the crime including the 29th date of February.   There were a total of 317 index crimes on this date, one of which was a homicide.  If these crimes were added to the crime for the month it is highly likely that crime is up.





Historically there has not been any conformity on accounting during the leap year.

Our concerns for crime fighting tactics also included an analysis of the methods that are used in the NYC Police Department to combat crime.  We found that although the commissioner put out an order against racial profiling, the police department’s pattern and practices dictates the contrary.  This fact was driven home when eight officers were transferred from the 75 precinct for not continuing to uses crime fighting strategies to profile people of color.  

We believe there has been an atmosphere of tolerance for abusing the crime fighting tools of Operation Impact, Operation Atlas, summons enforcement and Uf250's.  In spite of the constant denial that there are no summons quotas, far too many officers are being unfairly place on monitoring or discipline for not issuing a predetermine number of summons.  The department was disingenuous when they indicated that there was no summons blitz only to come out some time later and show that there was a substantial increase in the number of summonses issued.  

 “The administration reported that 532,817 summonses were issued by the New York Police Department in the fiscal year that ended June 30. The summonses were for a range of offenses, including graffiti, noise and disorderly conduct. Not only is that figure an increase over the previous year - and a slight increase over the year before that - but it represents more than 100,000 more summonses than city officials reported last fall. Police have not issued as many of these kinds of summonses since at least 1999, records show.” Aides to Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg said the discrepancy between the fall report and the Preliminary Mayor's Management Report issued yesterday was caused by an administrative error.- New York Times (January 28, 2004)

 Another crime fighting tool that has been abused under several police administrations, and continues under the current one, is the use of UF25O also known as the Stop Question and Frisk Report.  Police commanders have used this report as some form of activity generated measure.  Officers are told the number of UF250’s that are expected of them and they are penalized if they fall below the required numbers.  According to New York Attorney General Spitzer’s 1999 report, Stop Question and Frisk is at the heart of the racial profiling problem. 


We have sent a letter to the New York State Attorney General to conduct an audit on how the Police Department conduct these initiatives and what are the impact on the communities of color. 

The most deadly abuse of the crime fighting tools is the search warrant enforcement.  A review Commissioner Kelly’s actions preceding the death of Ms. Spruill gives a clear understanding of how search warrant initiative tool is abused.  

On May 16th Ms. Alberta Spruill died after the New York City Police Department initiated contact during the service of a search warrant at her residence. Fourteen days after her death the New York City Police Department released a report explaining the circumstances surrounding the events preceding her death. Included in the report was a list of deficiencies as well as proposed reforms to address the failures in the police department procedures.

Although the New York City Police Department's report is a refreshing change from the traditional and reflexive posture of denial, it falls substantially short of addressing the overall failures that lead to the death of Mrs. Spruill.  In fact the issue is far greater than the death of Mrs. Spruill.  We believe that the death of Mrs. Spruill is an indictment on how the N.Y.P.D. failed to ensure that a uniformed standard of police procedures are applied in all communities regardless of race or social status.  The incident should have served as the catalyst for major reform of the N.Y.P.D.'s policies, practices and procedures, and how application of the law is currently wrongly enforced based on the economic and ethnic demographics.

An examination of the Police Department's report exposes a long term stumbling block for reform;  the failure to release crucial information to either substantiate the N.Y.P.D.'s position  and/or validate their proposals.   In order to properly address the death of Mrs. Spruill, the Police Commissioner should have re-examined his administration’s war on drugs/crime.  In failing to critically analyze this crime strategy, the N.Y.P.D. continues to jeopardize the often tenuous relationship it has with the communities throughout this city.

A review of the events leading up to the death of Ms. Spruill shows how Police Commissioner Kelly failed to respond to clear warning signs that something was wrong with the warrant enforcement initiative.  The following events should have clearly been warning signs of an impending tragedy.

On March 2002 the police officers from the Queens Narcotics Division entered the home of Mrs. Flornell.  Her entire family was held in sheer terror for approximately three hours at gunpoint.  The house was thoroughly searched and its contents strewn carelessly about. No illegal drugs or weapons were recovered.  On month later, Police Commissioner Kelly met with the local branch NAACP and the enraged residents from the Far Rockaway community.  He informed them that he was going to conduct a comprehensive investigation and submit a report to ensure that this disturbing and traumatic incident would not be repeated.  As of this writing, that thorough investigation of search warrant procedures, never took place.  

In September 2002, the police forced their way into the home of Ms. Willamae Mack, where she resided with her 13-year-old twin boys.  Ms. Mack, who was peacefully sleeping, was pulled from her bed partially nude, after being awakened by the police busting into her home.   Her two sons heard a deafening explosion and a bright flash of light followed by strange loud voices.  In sheer terror, one of her boys scurried under the bed in an attempt to find safety.  The scared, dazed and confused young boys were pulled from under the bed at gunpoint and handcuffed.  A thorough and invasive search by the police officers yielded no illegal drugs or weapons.

On October 15th of the same year, the police, reportedly based on information
obtained from a confidential informant, forced their way into the home of Robert and Mary Rogers.  Robert is a retired Police Officer and Mary is a retired Department of Corrections Captain. Mr. Rogers, upon hearing the banging sound at his door drew his authorized firearm and strategically positioned himself to defend his family and property from the perceived threat. When the doors were violently opened Mr. Rogers recognized the intruders to in fact be police officers.  Mr. Rogers, fortunately, was able to place his firearm under his prone body before possibly being considered a threat to the officers and risk being shot.  

At a subsequent community meeting, Mr. Rogers related his traumatic experience directly to Police Commissioner Kelly who assured him that an investigation would take place and the necessary safeguards would be implemented to ensure that in the future, incidents such as his would be avoided.  As reported in one of the New York Newspapers, then N.Y.P.D. Deputy Commissioner of Public Information, Michael O'Looney, is quoted issuing assurances that a comprehensive review of the Rogers' incident would prevent future occurrences of this type. Deputy Commissioner O'Looney's comments clearly indicate that there was no comprehensive review or reform in spite of Commissioner Kelly's assurances in regards to the March search warrant execution incident.

On October 23rd, eight days after the incident at Mr. Robert's home, the Chief of
Patrol produced a memo to the Patrol Service Bureau and to the Special Operations Division.  Although this memo addressed some concerns, it was by no means a comprehensive study of search warrants execution.  Clearly a mere eight days is not enough time to conduct a detailed study on search warrant execution.  The memo was a hasty, inadequate response to a growing call for reform of search warrant execution.  Additionally the memo from the Chief of Patrol lacked the necessary impact had it been a Patrol Guide procedural change.  It also failed to address the distinctly different search warrant execution practices of the Organized Crime Control Bureau and the Detective Bureau.  Neither the Chief of the Organized Crime Control Bureau or the Detective Bureau submitted a memo in regards to the changes in search warrant execution procedures.  

During the month of January 2003, police officers forced their way into the home of an off duty police officer.  He was forced to the floor by gunpoint as his wife and children looked on in horror. The offending officer admitted making a "mistake".   He stated they were looking for a male white who was climbing on the outside terrace of the officer's building.  The off duty officer was an African-American.

These cases are just a small sample of incidents that have occurred.  Many others have not been properly documented.  Flawed search warrants are not new to the N.Y.P.D.  Under the previous administration, an off duty police officer discharged his gun during a search warrant execution at his residence and was almost killed.  Another case involved a mother being pulled out of her apartment nude in front of her neighbors, only to discover that the wrong apartment had been targeted.   

The lack of desire to institute true reform caused 100 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care, along with Civil Rights attorney Norman Siegel, to hold a press conference on November 19th to announce that a Notice of Claim was filed against the city for a law suit based on Roger and Mack incidents.   At that press conference Mr. Siegel stated that if something was not done to conduct a proper review of search warrant procedures, someone will lose their life.  Mrs. Spruill turned out to be that person because the N.Y.P.D. continued business as usual in spite of their empty promises.  

A further failure on the part of the Police Commissioner is his unwillingness to implement some of the following recommended changes in warrant enforcement.  Mr. Norman Siegel and members of 100 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care sent correspondence to the police commissioner regarding these issues.  He did not respond to the letter.

 Detailed analysis of warrants enforcement:

Although the Police Department's report discusses the death of Mrs. Spruill, there must be a more in depth analysis of how warrants are obtained and executed as well as the manner in which distraction devices (stun grenades) are used.  The review should account for the 9,242 warrants conducted over the previous 7 years and supply the following corresponding data:  (actual numbers, no percentages)

-Total number of search warrants executed. Indicate results and criminal charges.
-Warrant execution locations by county and precinct
-Racial/ethnic breakdown of homes where search warrants were executed
-Total number of distraction device (stun grenades) used
-Racial/ethnic breakdown of distraction device (stun grenades) used
-Total number of confidential informant generated search warrants
-Total number of confidential informants
-Total number of active confidential informants that have multiple negative results (more than 2)

End Warrant Quota System:

Although the use of no knock search warrants is an important tool that allows
law  enforcement officers the opportunity to use the element of surprise to apprehend dangerous individuals, it also has the potential of great harm to innocent citizens if used incorrectly.  During our review and interview with law enforcement personnel assigned to the Detective Bureau and Narcotics Division  (both entities frequently use search warrants), it was revealed that a non written standard has been put in place to compel units to increase their monthly execution of search warrants.  

This desire to fulfill a quota or productivity goal can lead to members of the police department taking unnecessary short cuts and failing to conduct the much needed investigation to corroborate information obtained from outside of the police department. An examination must be conducted by the N.Y.P.D. to determine if there has been a significant increase in Search Warrant executions over the past 5 years and what impact the increased volume has had on the quality of pre search warrant investigations.  This review could only be accurate if officers are questioned in a confidential fashion so as to insure candid responses.  A questionnaire that insures anonymity can assist in this process.

Increase Police Officers Accountability :
    The Police Department report failed to indicate what procedure would be put in place to analyze patterns involving police personnel who consistently produce search warrants with either negative hits or erroneous information.  Although a procedure is in place that removes a confidential informant from the program after a predetermined number of bad hits, there is not a similar check to ensure that an officer is not abusing the search warrant procedure.  The police department must conduct a though review of all warrants and determine if there are particular units or officers who have a pattern of producing bad results.  A comparison should be made between the inventories of items taking during search warrants with the original information on Search Warrant Application.  This could be one indicator to determine if an officer is conducting thorough investigations or simply doing hit and miss searches.   

Officers found to have flagrant abuses can be either retrained or removed from units that carry out search warrants.

    It should be further noted that officers should also prepare an affidavit regarding what their personal observations are concerning a search warrant.  This affidavit would put the burden on members to not use confidential informants as scapegoats, to cover up their failure to take the necessary steps to corroborate information.  

Extensive Reform in the Use of Distraction Devices (STUN GRENADE):
    The use of non-lethal weapons or distraction devices, including Stun Grenades is an important tool that often saves the lives of police personnel as well as emotionally disturbed persons (EDP).  The Police Department's report specifies the approval that is needed to use the device when executing a warrant, but it fails to indicate how it would be used when handling EDP's and other similar cases.  It would not be realistic to take away the authority to use this device from the Emergency Service Unit (ESU) supervisor on the scene during an encounter with an EDP or the likes.  As it currently stands a patrol captain or uniformed member assigned to ESU can use other non-lethal devices when they deem it appropriate.  This should also hold true for distraction devices.  The police department findings show that out of the seven year study where the stun grenade was used, 806 times there were no injuries to civilians.  

It should be further noted that each time the device was used, a report was prepared.  If the ESU supervisor did not receive the proper authority before using the stun grenade, then the police department had 806 opportunities to red flag this and take corrective actions.   

The fact that there were no injuries to civilians when ESU supervisors' evaluated when to use the device proves that there should not be a knee jerk reaction to take this authority from them.  While at the scene of an emergency, they are in the best position to determine the use of a distraction device or non lethal weapon.  

Proper Utilization of Emergency Service Unit Personnel:

No member of  N.Y.P.D. receives a higher level of tactical training than police officers assigned to ESU.  Having a non ESU ranking officer supersede the actions of a well trained ESU officer will only jeopardize the safety of all involved.  Even with proper training of newly promoted Captains. A Captains  know how cannot equal the experience that an officer who is assigned to ESU receives from their daily response to police emergencies.

As it currently stands, ESU personnel respond to all warrants where a high risk for danger such as dogs or guns may be present.   We believe this policy is flawed.  ESU personnel should be present at all warrants execution.  The recent shooting of a West African merchant involved a search warrant execution and did not fall under the current requirements for ESU response.  All search warrants have a possibility of turning violent and therefore should have the level of expertise and training present that only ESU personnel possess.   

Although we believe it is commendable that the police department will ensure that all Captains receive tactical training at the time of being promoted, this should not supersede the skills of ESU members of the service.  They are the most qualified to handle incidents such as warrant executions and violent emotionally disturbed persons (EDP's).

Re-focusing NYPD Drug Initiatives:

    Street level narcotic enforcement plays an important role in addressing every day quality of life crimes.  It however fails to substantially alleviate the larger burden that drugs and drug related violence brings.  The New York City Police Department must expand it drug fighting capabilities in order to make an impact on the illegal drug trade.   We believe the following two areas can address this expansion:

 Precinct SNEU teams can address the drug offenses that take place
on the street level.  This will free up the various narcotics units that are assigned under Organize Crime Control Bureau (OCCB) to go after the larger drug distributors.  The current NYPD drug initiatives are similar to attacking a small stream while the ocean of drugs goes for the most part ignored.  This posture will only continue to add to the ineffectiveness of making an impact on the drug trade
and therefore placing innocent citizens in harms way.  Members assigned to OCCB have long complained that they were being under utilized by targeting small time drug users.  More emphasis must be placed on the large quantities of drug movement in various parts of the city.  

 The police department initiative in less affluent communities is commendable; however the same cannot be said for affluent areas of the city. Based on our interviews with members assigned to OCCB they have indicated that there is no real initiative to target those areas where "White Collar" drug users frequent.  This flies in the face of FBI statistics that show that drug use is not limited by economic or racial boundaries.  The NYPD must do an analysis to determine if a uniform zero tolerance strategy is being used in all communities within New York City.  

It is unacceptable to use as a rationale that police enforce drug violations only when complaints come from community residents.  This sends the wrong message that the absence of complaints mean that no enforcement will be done.  A zero tolerance with drugs means addressing dealers and users alike.      

In cases where evidence has shown use among White Collar users, federal agencies as well as the NYPD have been reluctant to go after these groups (i.e. NY Post Wednesday, December 20, 2000).
Use of Video Cameras at Location:
    It is understood that no matter how careful the police department is, the possibility exist that mistakes will happen.  In many cases during these wrong door search warrant executions, victims complain about how the police treat them.  The use of a video camera at the location will document what treatment a person receives from police officers as well as protect police officers from false accusations.  

Scrutiny of Confidential Informants:
    All confidential informants (CI) are not alike.  With this in mind the New York City Police Department must put in place additional steps for verifying information that comes from a C.I. that is solely motivated by money.  As it currently stands a confidential informant can obtain up to $300.00 dollars from an investigator without obtaining approval from upper management.  This cash sum can motivate an unscrupulous informer to give erroneous information.  

    The agency should also encourage more confidential tips from the upstanding citizens in drug/crime ridden communities.  This target group's motivating factor is ridding their communities of crime and not solely motivated by cash compensation for their information.

Ensuring that Police Officers Are in Proper Identifiable Attire:
    In many areas that search warrants are conducted the residents have knowledge of incidents involving push-in robberies.  This makes it crucial that police personnel conduct warrants with the appropriate N.Y.P.D. identifiable police attire on.  Having a shield around an officer's neck is not enough to be identified.  Members at the scene should be inspected to insure they are wearing Police department issued jackets and uniforms.  This also helps when confronting an immigrant or person who speaks little English.  

Medical Personnel at Scene:

    A member from the NYFD Emergency Medical Service should be present at the scene of all search warrant executions.  This will ensure that immediate attention is available for members of the police department as well as any civilian that is injured due to the execution of the warrant.  As indicated in the Police Department's report, FDNY had to be dispatched to the scene.  They were not there from the start.  
The next area we examined is how this police commissioner’s administration addressed the terrorist issue.  We took into account that there have been no new attacks on New York citizen or property.  It is difficult to gauge if this is due to NYPD initiatives or the federal government homeland security actions, because there also has not been a new attack on America’s soil.  We gave the Commissioner a plus in the area of deterrent. 


 COMMUNITY RELATIONS       -     Grade  (C)

Police Commissioner Kelly has done an excellent job of changing the style of the police department response to the various communities within New York City.  He has not however, changed the substance.  His grade in this area is based on the following items:

 -Changing the tone that the NYC Police Department communicates with NYC various communities

-Expanded Police Department outreach to various community groups

-Abused of law enforcement initiatives

-Unwillingness to disband quota system

 -No current Deputy Commissioner of Community Affairs

 -Failure to incorporate the “Community Policing” model into crime-fighting strategies

 -Insensitive decision to appoint DC Fyfe to head Timothy Stansbury shooting report

-No outreach to non-traditional contacts to establish ‘official NYPD liaisons’


 The wedge that Commissioner Kelly’s administration is creating between the New York City Police Department and the communities is not detectable without an in depth examination.  As the years progress it will be increasingly more difficult to close the chasm with mere acknowledgements that a shooting is not justified.  On first appearance one will interpret the Commissioner's relationship with the community of color as a good one.  Although his public demeanor is not as combative as some of the men who formally held his position, he does not support this persona with his every day actions.

 It is commendable that this commissioner has taken the unprecedented steps of quickly acknowledging the lack of justification of certain shootings.  This however cannot be the cornerstone of community relations.  Cosmetic improvements are not enough, substantial policy and practice reforms need to be implemented.  We cannot ignore the crime fighting initiatives that will have a long lasting negative impact on New York City’s communities of color.  

 We also took into account in this area the insensitive decision Commissioner Kelly made to appoint Deputy Commissioner Fyfe to head the team that will put in place a recommendation in response to the Timothy Stansbury shooting.  In Deputy Commissioner Fyfe’s role as head of the New York City Police Academy, he has received several complaints from minority officers.  He also played a role in the trial surrounding the Amadou Diallo shooting.  During this trial Deputy Commissioner Fyfe stated in essence that the officers acted properly on the day that they shot Amadou Diallo.  We believed that the decision to appoint Fyfe to this important task showed a level of insensitivity on the Police Commissioner’s part. 

 Our evaluation has taken into account the failure of the administration to establish relationships with non traditional sources.  The community liaison program that exists in the Black community is nothing more than an exercise in public relations.  Outside of the Black community, the liaisons are granted privilege and access.  These are vital components to a respectful relationship.  The NYPD needs to upgrade and standardize the manner in which liaisons are dealt with to incorporate the Black community into the dialogue about NYPD strategies and objectives.

Finally, Commissioner Kelly’s failure to appoint a Deputy Commissioner of Community Affairs since the resignation of Deputy Commissioner Patrick, speaks volumes about his lack of commitment in this key area. 


Eric Adams

Co-Founder of 100 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care


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