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100 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care
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 | PROMOTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS (F) |
| POLICE DEPARTMENT MORALE (F) |
| INTERNAL DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT (D) |
| POLICE DEPARTMENT RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION (D) |
| POLICE ENFORCEMENT (C) |
| COMMUNITY RELATIONS (C) |
Each area is issued a letter grade from “A” to “F” (A being the best and “F” the worst) based on the organization’s analysis of the Police Commissioner’s successes or failures. At the beginning of each section the letter grade is stated followed by a list of bullet points highlighting the grade. The section is then concluded with a brief synopsis explaining each bullet point and the resulting grade.
Two years after Raymond
Kelly was appointed Police Commissioner there continues to be a void of
diversity in the command staff (Captain and above) of the NYPD. Blacks
have been all but removed from the policy making decisions in the following
areas:
No Black Executives assigned to the
following areas of the NYPD
LOCATION
# OF POTENTIAL ASSIGNMENTS
Detective Bureau
21 positions
Detective Borough
Manhattan
10 positions
Detective Borough
Queens
06 positions
Detective Borough
Brooklyn
05 positions
Detective Borough
Bronx
06 positions
Counter Terrorism Bureau
06 positions
Intelligence Division
09 positions
Special Operations
Division
10 positions
Traffic Control
Division
20 positions
1st DC office or
subunits*
12 positions
DC of Legal Matters or
subunits
09 positions
DC of Operations Office or
subunits
03 positions
DC of Management and Budget
or subunits
17 positions
DC of Technology and
Development
13 positions
DC of Strategic Analysis and
Planning (OMAT)
13 positions
Total
Positions
174
No Black Commanders assigned to the
following Bureaus or commands
LOCATION
# OF POTENTIAL ASSIGNMENTS
Patrol Borough
Commanders
07 positions
Transit Bureau*
04 positions
Transit Borough Manhattan
14 positions
Transit Borough Bronx 08 positions
Transit Borough Queens
07 positions
Transit Borough
Brooklyn
13 positions
Housing Borough Manhattan
09 positions
Housing Borough Bronx/
Queens
09 positions
Housing Borough
Brooklyn
07 positions
PBQN
23 positions
PBQS**
25 positions
PBBS***
38 positions
PBSI
12 positions
PBMS*****
32 positions
PBBX
34 positions
Transportation Bureau -
Support Services Bureau
13 positions
Criminal Justice Bureau
09 positions
MISD
__________
Total
Assignments 264
Notes:
*Transit Bureau has one
Black Deputy Inspector
**During our review one
Black CO was assigned to PBQS precinct
***During our review Deputy
Chief James Secreto was assigned to PBBS
(A Black captain was assigned here
during the Louima incident but was never promoted to CO, although other white
captains were promoted over him.)
*****PBMS has never in the history of the NYPD had a Black CO assigned to any of its precincts.
Lack of African-Americans assigned to
Precinct Squad Commander positions
LOCATIONS
# OF POTENTIAL ASSIGNMENTS
Detective Borough Manhattan
22 positions - 1 Black
assigned
Detective Borough Brooklyn
23 positions - 1 Black
assigned
Detective Borough Queens
16 positions - 0 Blacks
assigned
Detectives Staten Island
3 positions - 0
Blacks
Detective Borough Bronx
12 positions - 0 Blacks assigned
Total
Assignments
73 positions - 2 Blacks assigned
**There
is no Detective Borough in Staten Island.
(Patrol
Borough Staten Island supervises its own Detective Operations, which oversees
detective squads in each of that borough's three police precincts).
Lack of Black Executive representation
in special training and assignments
-No Black Unit Head in
charge of any Borough or Bureau Investigation Unit
-No Black Executive assigned
to an active role in the Republican National Convention
-Lack of Black
representation for the upcoming Olympic planning
-Lack of Black Executive
assigned to Police Management Institute training*
-Lack of Black applicants
assigned to external specialized training such as:
-FBI
Academy
-Educational Scholarships
NYPD SPECIALIZED UNITS WHERE THERE IS
A LACK OF AFRICAN AMERICANS ASSIGNED
Number of Number of
Number of
UNIT
Positions
Blacks assigned
Whites assigned
CHIEF
DEPT S.A. SECT.
009 000
007
DD
BS HOM. T/F
018
000
017
DISORDER
CONTROL
012 000
011
GANG
SQ. S.I.
017 000
015
PBQS ANTI CRIME*
PBSI
ANTI CRIME
015
000
014
S.I.
DA SQUAD
015
000
014
NARC
BORO S.I.
025 000
021
PBBS
ANTI CRIME*
017
001 015
PBQN
ANTI CRIME*
014 001
011
BOMB
SQUAD
036
001
035
DD
QNS. HOM. T/F
031
001
026
GANG SQ. BS
AVIATION
UNIT
061
002
053
PBMS
ANTI CRIME*
029 002
020
CANINE
TEAM
045
003
034
GANG
SQ. BN
035 003
029
GANG
SQ. QNS
035 003
024
HWY DISTRICT
GANG
DIVISION
040
004
032
INTELL
PUB. SECURITY
058 004
046
AUTO
CRIME
111
005 095
HARBOR
UNIT
173 006
154
JOINT
TERRORIST T/F
136
006
113
FIREARMS
TACTICS
149
007
119
CITYWIDE
ESU
482 046
388
HWY
UNIT 1- 5 (TOTAL)
324 048
258
*Formerly the Street Crime
Unit. The Street Crime unit had a
history of excluding minority officers.
In addition to the above
data, the poor grade issued in this area also took into account the following
information:
-Proposed termination of promotional exam eligibility every two years
-Practice of one discretionary promotion of Black Executive uniformed member at
a time
-Failure to routinely send ranking Black members to PMI training
-Regulating Black ranking members to non-policy making positions
-Failure to assign Black Captains to precinct commands as XO or CO
-Failure to assign the only black female captain on patrol to XO or CO position
-Failed to use discretionary promotion of detectives from narcotics/gun unit
-Failure to diversity all units within the NYC Police Department
-Lack of a clear career promotional path for members in the ranks of Detective
-Lack of representation for
African-Americans in the skilled civilian workforce
-Placement of low level
white supervisors over ranking members of the Traffic Enforcement Division
-Refusal to fill DCCA
position that historically was held by a minority
PROMOTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS BRIEFING
Commissioner Kelly has
failed to use his office to ensure that diversity is of paramount importance to
the missions and goals of the NYC Police Department. Although he has made
a few ceremonial promotions, he has not used his discretionary powers to appoint
qualified African-Americans to policy making positions. Although civil
service controls the manner in which a member of service is promoted in the rank
structure, it does not control how the Commissioner uses his discretionary
powers to appoint Unit heads and Deputy Commissioners. Ranking Black
members have also been kept out of the planning, implementation and operations
of prestigious projects such as the Republican National Convention and proposed
upcoming Olympics. On paper Blacks have been indicated as being part of
these committees, but in practice they are left out of the planning and
implementation stages. These assignments offer a vast amount of
opportunity to network and expand one’s technological abilities.
Commissioner Kelly has failed to continuously send a Black representative to the
prestigious Police Management Institute. The course has been offered to
those members who are chosen to eventually serve in the higher executive command
structure. Under Commissioner Kerik two Blacks were chosen to attend
during one cycle. Under Commissioner Kelly, no Blacks were chosen for the
previous cycle. It was not until
reports of this review were to be released that his administration decided in
the final hours to send one Black Executive representative during the current
cycle.
In the area of patrol assignments Commissioner Kelly has not assigned one Black
ranking member to the role of Borough Commander. The only Black female
Captain on patrol has not been designated to become an Executive Officer which
is historically a prerequisite to becoming a Precinct Commanding Officer.
The effect of Commissioner Kelly's lack of inclusion is also felt in agencies
that were absorbed by the NYC Police Department. During his two years in
office he has placed mid level white male police supervisors over the black
ranking members of the Traffic Enforcement Division.
Detectives assigned as undercovers to the Narcotics and Firearms unit are not
issued grade promotions in comparison to the level of danger that their
assignments bring. After the deaths of Detective Rodney Andrews and
Detective James Nemorin left the front pages of the daily tabloids, Commissioner
Kelly returned to business as usual of having officers of color doing the most
dangerous assignments with the least rewards. Although Blacks make up a
significant number of detectives they are not represented in the managerial
level of the Detective Bureau. In the entire city, there are only two
Black Squad Commanders out of the 76 Precinct Detective Squads.
The most telling area of Commissioner Kelly’s lack of concern for future
improvement in diversifying the ranks of the police department is in his
decision to terminate examination established promotion eligibility every two
years. This will have a disproportionate impact on the future of Black
supervisors. He made this decision without any empirical data that shows
the cancellation of examination based eligibility will benefit the police
department's supervisory ranks. When Commissioner Kelly was questioned
about the lack of precinct commanders, he responded by stating “the root
of the issue is that some officers are not studying for advancement. The
department has only 11 black officers at the rank of captain or above.
I urge anyone in the department to study for promotion. We just
don't have enough minorities now."
Commissioner Kelly made
these comments knowing that terminating the promotional list after two years
will result in disqualifying Black candidates who have "studied."
An examination of the current captain list of 275 potential captains shows the
following in regards to minority candidates:
LOCATION OF MINORITIES ON CURRENT
CAPTAIN LIST
RACE
LIST# 1 – 137
LIST #138-275
Male Black
1
3
Female Black
0
3
Male Hispanic
6
9
Female Hispanic
2
3
Male Asian
1
2
Female Asian
0
0
Female White 5 4
The above Captains
eligibility list is broken down into two areas. The first area list numbers 1 – 137 are the number of
captains eligible to be promoted under Commissioner Kelly’s two year
eligibility plan. The second area
list numbers 138 – 275, will be excluded under the Commissioner’s plans.
The ethnic demographic breakdown clearly shows that the Commissioner
Kelly plan will continue the systemic exclusion of people of color from the
position of Captain.
This brief analysis shows
that if in fact the Commissioner’s plans are carried out, the only three Black
females on the captain list will not be promoted. Only one African-American will
be promoted from the entire civil service list. As it currently stands there are only two African-American
female captains.
It should be noted that the
men and women on any promotional list are the top scorers in their rank. For
example the 275 potential Captains on the current list were the best out of the
potential 1716 eligible Lieutenants. This
current list has the largest number of minority eligibles in the history of the
NYPD. It was only the last
Captain’s exam that the first Female Hispanic was promoted to the rank of
captain. She was promoted at the
fourth year level of the list. If the Commissioner Kelly’s plan was in place then, we
would still be without a Hispanic Captain.
The Commissioner is making
the decision to turn the traditional four year eligibility list into two years
with the knowledge that 91% of NYPD uniformed personnel in the rank of Captain
and above are Caucasians. Historically
the Captain’s exam was allowed to run the full four year life of the list.
Commissioner Kelly is making
this decision without any empirical data that shows it would benefit the overall
running of the department. It would
in fact have an immediate negative impact on years of attempts to diversify the
police department’s command staff.
An additional area of
concern is the civilian skilled workforce ranks.
Although African-Americans make up the majority of the civilian strength
of the NYPD, they are under represented in the skilled labor pool.
Ethnic Breakdown of Civilian Workforce
vs
Skilled Workers
Black
White
Hispanic
Other
Civilian Workforce
9864
3200
3379
697
57.1%
18.9%
19.9%
4.1%
Skilled Craft workers
55
363
62
33
10.7% 70.8% 12.1% 6.4%
Analysis of the Traffic Enforcement
Division
One area that is alarming is
how the Police Commissioner handled the merger of Traffic Enforcement Agents.
A review of the aftermath of this action shows that Commissioner Kelly
has little or no confidence in Black managers’ ability to handle duties that
they historical have handled well. The
managerial rank of the Traffic Enforcement Division structure prior to the
merger was as follows:
-Chief
-Deputy
Chief
-Assistant
Chief
-Inspector
-Captain
-Lieutenant
Many of the above titles
were held by people of color. The
Traffic Enforcement Division has historically been one of the only law
enforcement agencies that was predominantly ran by people of color and many of
them were women. Throughout the
years they have been very successful at managing this largely minority city
agency. Commissioner Kelly’s
administration rewarded them by completely revamping the rank structure and, in
the process, denying them upwardly mobility.
The new rank structure is following:
-Deputy
Inspector (NYPD member)
-Director
-Deputy
Director
-Captain
(NYPD member)
-TM
-Lieutenant
(NYPD member)
-Sergeant
-TS-3
-TS-2
-TS-1
An analysis of the new
managerial hierarchy chart shows that Commissioner Kelly creatively undermined
the authority of Traffic managers by placing a NYPD Deputy Inspector over the
entire unit and then infusing NYPD Captains, Lieutenants and Sergeants over the
existing Traffic Enforcement managerial staff.
This is an unprecedented move that completely circumvented the
overwhelming existing minority managerial staff and, in the process, neutralized
their decision making abilities. This
action has also created a glass ceiling where there is little or no upward
movement.
POLICE
DEPARTMENT MORALE - Grade
(F)
Police Commissioner Kelly has
carried out several actions that have hurt morale in the New York City Police
Department.
-Recent independent study showed 68% of NYPD supervisors, detectives and police
officers believed morale declined under Police Commissioner Kelly
-Officers are continually told that they are not doing a good job by their
supervisors in spite of the decrease in crime
-PBA's vote of no confidence for the Police Commissioner reflects the overall
atmosphere within the precincts
-Precincts are in poor physical conditions
-Precincts lack the basic supplies needed to perform routine police duties
-Officers were punished by being transferred for not following NYPD's quota
system
-Union representatives had their parking permits removed because they spoke on
behalf of those transferred members.
-Failure to come to the defense of Emergency Dispatch Operators during boating
accident
-Refusal to address repeated complaints from School Safety Agents regarding lack
of equipment and contradictory departmental policies.
-Abuse of Performance Monitoring Program
POLICE MORALE BRIEFING
The most telling sign that
morale has fallen since the departure of Police Commissioner Kerik is the
outcome of an independent survey that was reported in the New York Daily News on
June 14th 2003. In the report 68% of the officers interviewed
stated that they believed moral declined under Police Commissioner Kelly.
Unlike the caring, concerned approach that previous Commissioner Bernard Kerik
displayed for his men and women in uniform, Commissioner Kelly has not shown
that concern. Many commanders feel as though they have reached a glass
ceiling as they are held in the position of precinct commanders for long periods
of time. Under Commissioner Kelly,
there has been very little movement on the precinct level due to his slow micro
managed approach of the current administration.
The precinct fix up program that was initiated under the previous commissioner
was abandoned and many precincts have had to contend with rodent infested work
locations. In many worksites there is a shortage of cleaners that lead to
large amounts of garbage and rest rooms left unclean throughout the entire
weekend.
Civilian and uniformed members assigned to clerical duties are not issued the
basic supplies needed to carry out normal record keeping functions.
Police Officers feel that they have been relegated to 'quota cops'. There
continues to be a reckless push to achieve 'performance goals' on the backs of
the citizenry. This leaves the average patrol officer in an unenviable
position; disliked by the public and unappreciated by management.
Many officers have been placed in the Performance Monitoring Program for no
other reason than that they have not met the Police Department predetermined
quotas.
The recent no confidence vote by the Patrolman Benevolent Association signified
the overall sentiment that police officers have towards Commissioner Kelly's
administration. As the largest union representing the rank and file
officer, the PBA made this decision based on the climate that has been created
by Commissioner Kelly. Although the "not justified" comment was
mentioned in their no confidence vote, it was not the sole reason for the vote.
There were series of morale depleting actions by the Police Commissioner that
led to this posture by the PBA's leadership and members.
The falling morale has also effected how the police department is adjusting to
the merger of School Safety Agents. Members assigned to protect our
schools have not had their repeated calls for better equipment and clarity in
department rules addressed. Commissioner Kelly's lack of response has left
the Agents no other choice but to take to the streets and demonstrate their lack
of confidence in his leadership.
INTERNAL
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT - Grade (D)
Commissioner Kelly has failed to address the glaring racial imbalance in the New
York City Police Department's disciplinary system as follows:
-Refusal to conduct and audit how discipline is issued along racial lines
-Refusal to ensure that penalties issued are standardized regardless of race
-Refusal to use his office as the final determining body to correct unfair trial
room decisions
-Failure to issue harsh discipline to white officers involved in criminal
behavior
INTERNAL DISCIPLINE BRIEFING
On February 1, 2004 the
Latino Officers Association announced the details of their class action law suit
that was settled with the New York City Police Department. The basis of
the law suit was that Black and Latino officers were disciplined at a
disproportionate rate in comparison to their white counterparts during the
periods of 1996-1999.
Although these periods do not impact on the time frame that Police Commissioner
Kelly was heading the department, many of the policies and practices that were in place are still in place under
his leadership. When we met with Commissioner Kelly on June 13, 2002 we
raised the disparate discipline problems and made a request for him to conduct
an in depth study on the role race plays in departmental discipline from the
command level all the way through to the trial room. One year and eight
months later Commissioner Kelly has not moved any closer to conducting that
study or correcting the problems that plague the disciplinary process.
100 Blacks in Law Enforcement sent out their questionnaire to various members of
the department to determine if there were any announced improvements with the
department's internal disciplinary process. To our dismay our survey
showed that members of the department from the rank of police officer to captain
were being disciplined at a higher rate then their white counterparts.
Several cases were of special concern to us.
One involved a white probationary Lieutenant that openly assaulted a
handcuffed prisoner in open view of officers at the front desk. Although
several officers came forwarded and reported the Lieutenant's actions, he was
not demoted or arrested. His penalty was several days' suspension and one
year probation, the same form of penalty that was issued to a 17 year Black
female detective after being charged with discourtesy to a supervisor.
Other cases that were flagged by our survey included a white captain that was
found guilty of leaking information regarding an internal investigation yet he
was allowed to be promoted. He then subsequently was allowed to retire
while additional charges were pending against him. This was occurring
while a Hispanic Captain was not allowed to retire even though there were less
serious charges pending against him.
These were only a couple of examples of how there was a presence of unfair
treatment in the disciplinary process from command level up to and including the
department trial room. To date Commissioner Kelly has not taken any
substantial steps towards correcting these actions. His cosmetic appointment of
an African-American in the Department Advocate office is futile without a
complete overhaul of the entire system. It took a class action law suit
for the Commissioner to recognize that.
POLICE
DEPARTMENT RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION - Grade
(D)
Police Commissioner Kelly
failed to improve in the area of recruitment for the following reasons:
-No innovative effort to implement a diversity recruitment drive
-Failure to reach out to non traditional organizations for assistance in
recruitment drive
-Unwillingness to include non traditional methods of dispensing financial
resources to improve recruitment drive
-Failure to conduct a study to determine the necessity for college requirements
to become a police officer.
-Violating the Memorandum of Understanding put in place after the merger of
School Safety and Traffic Enforcement officers in regards to career advancement
-Using bloated recruitment numbers to give the appearance of success
-Failed to give analysis for
Ivy League school recruitment strategy.
POLICE RECRUITMENT BRIEFING
The New York City
recruitment diversity effort is cloaked in lies and distortions. In many
cases the Police Commissioner has issued bloated numbers to indicate a
successful drive. When the numbers are scrutinized it is easy to determine
that the drives have been total failures. The department boasts that Since
December 2003, 31,770 people have applied for the recent NYC Police
Officer Exams. They believe this is a vast improvement from the dismal and
embarrassing 3,323 who filed for the exam in June of 2003. According to
the Commissioner's statements this improvement occurred because of his decision
to drop the $35.00 fee that was previously charged to take the exam.
What Police Commissioner Kelly has failed to mentioned is that in February of
2003 fewer than 4,000 of the over 14, 000 people who signed up for the exam
actually showed up to take the test. Additionally, out of the praised
31,770 potential applicants, only 19,000 actually called and reserved a seat to
even take the exam.
Recently the NYPD claimed
success due to the turnout of 10,761 people who took the exam on Feb. 20 and 21.
Deputy Chief George Anderson stated “things are looking up.”
Apparently ‘up’ is a relative term to the NYPD.
The fact still remained that of the over 31,770 people who applied to
take the exam, only 16,547 even reserved a seat. Based on the normal course of recruitment and retention, the
‘success’ will be the actual hiring of a mere 10% of those who actually take
the exam, approximately 1,654 people. If
the pattern of hiring continues, then the number of African-Americans will be an
insignificant number of those actually hired.
Given the dismal rate of return, the recruitment effort is not even cost
effective.
In spite of these poor
figures the police department has refused to reinstitute a successful program
approved by former Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik. The program was in
conformity with the Memorandum of Understanding that was signed during the
merger. It called for the implementation of a career advancement incentive
for School Safety Agents and Traffic Enforcement Agents. Commissioner
Kerik's plan called for a college waiver incentive for employees of both
agencies after a two year successful stint in their agencies. Commissioner
Kelly removed this program without warning. It should be noted that the
School Safety Division and the Traffic Enforcement Division are two agencies
that have an employee staff that is 81% Black and Hispanics.
Ethnic Breakdown of Traffic
Enforcement Agents & School Safety Officers
Black
Hispanic
White
Other
57.3% 24.5%
14.0% 4.2%
Both agencies are
currently under the control of the New York City Police Department.
Although Commissioner Kelly removed the college wavier for these predominantly
minority agencies, he allowed it to remain for those in military service. It
should be noted that School Safety Agents and Traffic Enforcement Agents are
trained by the NYPD to interact with the public in a non-lethal manner, whereas
the Military is trained to use lethal force.
The Commissioner also
received an asterisk in this area due to his failure to give a fair analysis of
the cost success ratio in regards to the Ivy League school recruitment
initiative. A large sum of manpower
and revenue was used to go outside the city and target Ivy League schools.
A report must be generated to determine if this initiative was cost
effective. As of today no
such report has been made public. There
appear to be a strong possibility that this endeavor was a complete waste of
taxpayer’s resources.
On all accounts the
recruitment process has been a complete failure.
POLICE
ENFORCEMENT -
Grade (C )*
Commissioner Kelly receives a “C” in this area with an asterisk. His actions in the area of police enforcement and addressing the terrorist threat are based on the following:
-Unsuccessful transition
from the success of former Commissioner Bratton's crime fighting strategies and
initiatives
-Abuse of crime fighting strategies Operation Impact and Operation Atlas
-Abuse of Warrant initiative
-Abuse of summons enforcement
-Abuse of UF 250's (Stop Question and Frisk forms)
-Failure to terminate
summons quota system
-Questionable successful in
terrorist crime fighting strategy
-Failure to implement comprehensive terrorist training program for uniform officers
-Successful handling of
large crowds at non-confrontational events
-Limited success at handling large crowds at challenging peaceful events, i.e.
war rally
POLICE ENFORCEMENT BRIEFING
The Police
Commissioner’s grade is based on several variables.
We looked at the seven major crimes that are used by the FBI to indicate
the success or failure of crime fighting initiatives.
Our comprehensive review of
the Police Commissioner in this area shows that he has failed to follow the
successful trend first implemented by Commissioner Bratton and followed by his
predecessors. By using crafty crime
recording methods the police department has given the appearance that crime is
continuing to drop, but there remains a question mark whether in fact it is
true.
The repeated accusations
from groups such as the PBA that Police Department is mis-classifying crimes to
give lower numbers should be accurately investigated by an external body to
determine if this in fact is true. This
could be accomplished by calling in all precinct crime analysis personnel and
questioning them under oath to determine the role in crime classification.
The external investigator should also conduct an audit to determine the
legitimacy in the number of crime re-classifications.
Even by NYPD records the
homicide rate has in fact increased. And that is the Homicide rate citywide for the two year crime
periods. Police stats show that the
number of homicides for this time frame increased by 15.3%.
This trend appears to be more so in the African-American
community where Homicide is on the increase.
It has been incorrectly
interpreted that because crime is down that all communities are living safer.
The fact is that crime can be down in one area of the city but up in
other locations. A review of
crime by precinct shows that 40% of the total numbers of precincts are showing
an increase in crime.
31 PRECINCTS WITH CRIME INCREASES:
PRECINCT
% INCREASE
010
34.43
070
15.92
107
14.45
018
13.77
112
13.27
026
12.98
090
12.53
006
12.12
017
11.14
063
10.06
009
9.90
030
9.01
120
8.90
050
7.80
068
7.50
073
6.89
069
6.12
040
5.85
034
5.57
114
4.95
019
3.83
066
2.91
111
2.70
115
2.65
079
2.55
076
2.34
075
2.11
033
1.74
072
1.69
044
0.67
067
0.53
The above listed
precinct increases in crime still does not show the true crime picture.
A particular precinct may not be on this list because the overall total
of crime is down (total of 7 majors), but in one of the particular crime area
there could be an increase. For
instance a precinct can be down in Grand Larcenies but up in robberies and
rapes. In several areas of the city
this holds true. For instance Patrol Borough Queens South is down overall in
crime, but has an increase in the number of murders, rapes, and burglaries.
Crime Increases By Borough Command
PBBN
PBQN
PBQS
PBMS
PBBX
PBSI
Murder Burglary
Murder
Rape
Murder Rape
Rape
Rape
G. Larc.
Robbery
Fel. Aslt
Burglary
Fel. Aslt.
Burglary
G. Larc.
GLA
It is not enough to use
simple stats as indicators of public safety when there are several communities
that are still showing a substantial number of predatory crimes.
One troubling form of record
keeping “slight of hand” is the ignoring of all crime that occurred on
February 29th. This is a
crime fighting record keeping trick to use the leap year as an excuse to not
account for crime on this date. We
believe the Police Department should
give dual reports during this period to account for the crime including the 29th
date of February. There were
a total of 317 index crimes on this date, one of which was a homicide.
If these crimes were added to the crime for the month it is highly likely
that crime is up.
FEBRUARY 29TH CRIME NUMBERS
317
INDEX CRIMES
1 HOMICIDE
Historically there has not
been any conformity on accounting during the leap year.
Our concerns for crime
fighting tactics also included an analysis of the methods that are used in the
NYC Police Department to combat crime. We
found that although the commissioner put out an order against racial profiling,
the police department’s pattern and practices dictates the contrary.
This fact was driven home when eight officers were transferred from the
75 precinct for not continuing to uses crime fighting strategies to profile
people of color.
We believe there has been an
atmosphere of tolerance for abusing the crime fighting tools of Operation
Impact, Operation Atlas, summons enforcement and Uf250's. In spite of the
constant denial that there are no summons quotas, far too many officers are
being unfairly place on monitoring or discipline for not issuing a predetermine
number of summons. The department
was disingenuous when they indicated that there was no summons blitz only to
come out some time later and show that there was a substantial increase in the
number of summonses issued.
“The
administration reported that 532,817 summonses were issued by the New York
Police Department in the fiscal year that ended June 30. The summonses were for
a range of offenses, including graffiti, noise and disorderly conduct. Not only
is that figure an increase over the previous year - and a slight increase over
the year before that - but it represents more than 100,000 more summonses than
city officials reported last fall. Police have not issued as many of these kinds
of summonses since at least 1999, records show.” Aides to Mayor Michael R.
Bloomberg said the discrepancy between the fall report and the Preliminary
Mayor's Management Report issued yesterday was caused by an administrative
error.- New York Times (January 28, 2004)
Another crime fighting
tool that has been abused under several police administrations, and continues
under the current one, is the use of UF25O also known as the Stop Question and
Frisk Report. Police commanders
have used this report as some form of activity generated measure.
Officers are told the number of UF250’s that are expected of them and
they are penalized if they fall below the required numbers.
According to New York Attorney General Spitzer’s 1999 report, Stop
Question and Frisk is at the heart of the racial profiling problem.
We have sent a letter to the
New York State Attorney General to conduct an audit on how the Police Department
conduct these initiatives and what are the impact on the communities of color.
On May 16th Ms. Alberta
Spruill died after the New York City Police Department initiated contact during
the service of a search warrant at her residence. Fourteen days after her death
the New York City Police Department released a report explaining the
circumstances surrounding the events preceding her death. Included in the report
was a list of deficiencies as well as proposed reforms to address the failures
in the police department procedures.
Although the New York City Police Department's report is a refreshing change
from the traditional and reflexive posture of denial, it falls substantially
short of addressing the overall failures that lead to the death of Mrs. Spruill.
In fact the issue is far greater than the death of Mrs. Spruill. We
believe that the death of Mrs. Spruill is an indictment on how the N.Y.P.D.
failed to ensure that a uniformed standard of police procedures are applied in
all communities regardless of race or social status. The incident should
have served as the catalyst for major reform of the N.Y.P.D.'s policies,
practices and procedures, and how application of the law is currently wrongly
enforced based on the economic and ethnic demographics.
An examination of the Police Department's report exposes a long term stumbling
block for reform; the failure to release crucial information to either
substantiate the N.Y.P.D.'s position and/or validate their proposals.
In order to properly address the death of Mrs. Spruill, the Police
Commissioner should have re-examined his administration’s war on drugs/crime.
In failing to critically analyze this crime strategy, the N.Y.P.D.
continues to jeopardize the often tenuous relationship it has with the
communities throughout this city.
A review of the events leading up to the death of Ms. Spruill shows how Police
Commissioner Kelly failed to respond to clear warning signs that something was
wrong with the warrant enforcement initiative.
The following events should have clearly been warning signs of an
impending tragedy.
On March 2002 the police officers from the Queens Narcotics Division entered the
home of Mrs. Flornell. Her entire family was held in sheer terror for
approximately three hours at gunpoint. The house was thoroughly searched
and its contents strewn carelessly about. No illegal drugs or weapons were
recovered. On month later, Police Commissioner Kelly met with the local
branch NAACP and the enraged residents from the Far Rockaway community. He
informed them that he was going to conduct a comprehensive investigation and
submit a report to ensure that this disturbing and traumatic incident would not
be repeated. As of this writing, that thorough investigation of search
warrant procedures, never took place.
In September 2002, the
police forced their way into the home of Ms. Willamae Mack, where she resided
with her 13-year-old twin boys. Ms. Mack, who was peacefully sleeping, was
pulled from her bed partially nude, after being awakened by the police busting
into her home. Her two sons heard a deafening explosion and a bright
flash of light followed by strange loud voices. In sheer terror, one of
her boys scurried under the bed in an attempt to find safety. The scared,
dazed and confused young boys were pulled from under the bed at gunpoint and
handcuffed. A thorough and invasive search by the police officers yielded
no illegal drugs or weapons.
On October 15th of the same
year, the police, reportedly based on information
obtained from a confidential informant, forced their way into the home of Robert
and Mary Rogers. Robert is a retired Police Officer and Mary is a retired
Department of Corrections Captain. Mr. Rogers, upon hearing the banging sound at
his door drew his authorized firearm and strategically positioned himself to
defend his family and property from the perceived threat. When the doors were
violently opened Mr. Rogers recognized the intruders to in fact be police
officers. Mr. Rogers, fortunately, was able to place his firearm under his
prone body before possibly being considered a threat to the officers and risk
being shot.
At a subsequent community meeting, Mr. Rogers related his traumatic experience
directly to Police Commissioner Kelly who assured him that an investigation
would take place and the necessary safeguards would be implemented to ensure
that in the future, incidents such as his would be avoided. As reported in
one of the New York Newspapers, then N.Y.P.D. Deputy Commissioner of Public
Information, Michael O'Looney, is quoted issuing assurances that a comprehensive
review of the Rogers' incident would prevent future occurrences of this type.
Deputy Commissioner O'Looney's comments clearly indicate that there was no
comprehensive review or reform in spite of Commissioner Kelly's assurances in
regards to the March search warrant execution incident.
On October 23rd, eight days after the incident at Mr. Robert's home, the Chief
of
Patrol produced a memo to the Patrol Service Bureau and to the Special
Operations Division. Although this memo addressed some concerns, it was by
no means a comprehensive study of search warrants execution. Clearly a
mere eight days is not enough time to conduct a detailed study on search warrant
execution. The memo was a hasty, inadequate response to a growing call for
reform of search warrant execution. Additionally the memo from the Chief
of Patrol lacked the necessary impact had it been a Patrol Guide procedural
change. It also failed to address the distinctly different search warrant
execution practices of the Organized Crime Control Bureau and the Detective
Bureau. Neither the Chief of the Organized Crime Control Bureau or the
Detective Bureau submitted a memo in regards to the changes in search warrant
execution procedures.
During the month of January 2003, police officers forced their way into the home
of an off duty police officer. He was forced to the floor by gunpoint as
his wife and children looked on in horror. The offending officer admitted making
a "mistake". He stated they were looking for a male white
who was climbing on the outside terrace of the officer's building. The off
duty officer was an African-American.
These cases are just a small sample of incidents that have occurred. Many
others have not been properly documented. Flawed search warrants are not
new to the N.Y.P.D. Under the previous administration, an off duty police
officer discharged his gun during a search warrant execution at his residence
and was almost killed. Another case involved a mother being pulled out of
her apartment nude in front of her neighbors, only to discover that the wrong
apartment had been targeted.
The lack of desire to institute true reform caused 100 Blacks in Law Enforcement
Who Care, along with Civil Rights attorney Norman Siegel, to hold a press
conference on November 19th to announce that a Notice of Claim was filed against
the city for a law suit based on Roger and Mack incidents. At that
press conference Mr. Siegel stated that if something was not done to conduct a
proper review of search warrant procedures, someone will lose their life. Mrs.
Spruill turned out to be that person because the N.Y.P.D. continued business as
usual in spite of their empty promises.
A further failure on the part of the Police Commissioner is his unwillingness to
implement some of the following recommended changes in warrant enforcement.
Mr. Norman Siegel and members of 100 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care
sent correspondence to the police commissioner regarding these issues.
He did not respond to the letter.
Detailed
analysis of warrants enforcement:
Although the Police
Department's report discusses the death of Mrs. Spruill, there must be a more in
depth analysis of how warrants are obtained and executed as well as the manner
in which distraction devices (stun grenades) are used. The review should
account for the 9,242 warrants conducted over the previous 7 years and supply
the following corresponding data: (actual numbers, no percentages)
-Total number of search warrants executed. Indicate results and criminal
charges.
-Warrant execution locations by county and precinct
-Racial/ethnic breakdown of homes where search warrants were executed
-Total number of distraction device (stun grenades) used
-Racial/ethnic breakdown of distraction device (stun grenades) used
-Total number of confidential informant generated search warrants
-Total number of confidential informants
-Total number of active confidential informants that have multiple negative
results (more than 2)
End Warrant Quota System:
Although the use of no knock search warrants is an important tool that allows
law enforcement officers the opportunity to use the element of surprise to
apprehend dangerous individuals, it also has the potential of great harm to
innocent citizens if used incorrectly. During our review and interview
with law enforcement personnel assigned to the Detective Bureau and Narcotics
Division (both entities frequently use search warrants), it was revealed
that a non written standard has been put in place to compel units to increase
their monthly execution of search warrants.
This desire to fulfill a quota or productivity goal can lead to members of the
police department taking unnecessary short cuts and failing to conduct the much
needed investigation to corroborate information obtained from outside of the
police department. An examination must be conducted by the N.Y.P.D. to determine
if there has been a significant increase in Search Warrant executions over the
past 5 years and what impact the increased volume has had on the quality of pre
search warrant investigations. This review could only be accurate if
officers are questioned in a confidential fashion so as to insure candid
responses. A questionnaire that insures anonymity can assist in this
process.
Increase Police Officers Accountability :
The Police Department report failed to indicate what
procedure would be put in place to analyze patterns involving police personnel
who consistently produce search warrants with
either negative hits or erroneous information. Although a procedure is in
place that removes a confidential informant from the program after a
predetermined number of bad hits, there is not a similar check to ensure that an
officer is not abusing the search warrant procedure. The police
department must conduct a though review of all warrants and determine if there
are particular units or officers who have a pattern of producing bad results.
A comparison should be made between the inventories of items taking during
search warrants with the original information on Search Warrant Application.
This could be one indicator to determine if an officer is conducting
thorough investigations or simply doing hit and miss searches.
Officers found to have flagrant abuses can be either retrained or removed from
units that carry out search warrants.
It should be further noted that officers should also prepare
an affidavit regarding what their personal observations are concerning a search
warrant. This affidavit would put the burden on members to not use
confidential informants as scapegoats, to cover up their failure to take the
necessary steps to corroborate information.
Extensive Reform in the Use of Distraction Devices (STUN GRENADE):
The use of non-lethal weapons or distraction devices,
including Stun Grenades is an important tool that often saves the lives of
police personnel as well as emotionally disturbed persons (EDP). The
Police Department's report specifies the approval that is needed to use the
device when executing a warrant, but it fails to indicate how it would be used
when handling EDP's and other similar cases. It would not be realistic to
take away the authority to use this device from the Emergency Service Unit (ESU)
supervisor on the scene during an encounter with an EDP or the likes. As
it currently stands a patrol captain or uniformed member assigned to ESU can use
other non-lethal devices when they deem it appropriate. This should also
hold true for distraction devices. The police department findings show
that out of the seven year study where the stun grenade was used, 806 times
there were no injuries to civilians.
It should be further noted that each time the device was used, a report was
prepared. If the ESU supervisor did not receive the proper authority
before using the stun grenade, then the police department had 806 opportunities
to red flag this and take corrective actions.
The fact that there were no injuries to civilians when ESU supervisors'
evaluated when to use the device proves that
there should not be a knee jerk reaction to take this authority from them.
While at the scene of an emergency, they are in the best position to
determine the use of a distraction device or non lethal weapon.
Proper Utilization of Emergency Service
Unit Personnel:
No member of N.Y.P.D. receives a higher level of tactical training than
police officers assigned to ESU. Having a non ESU ranking officer
supersede the actions of a well trained ESU officer will only jeopardize the
safety of all involved. Even with proper training of newly promoted
Captains. A Captains know how cannot equal the experience that an officer
who is assigned to ESU receives from their daily response to police emergencies.
As it currently stands, ESU personnel respond to all warrants where a high risk
for danger such as dogs or guns may be present. We believe this
policy is flawed. ESU personnel should be present at all warrants
execution. The recent shooting of a West African merchant involved a
search warrant execution and did not fall under the current requirements for ESU
response. All search warrants have a possibility of turning violent and
therefore should have the level of expertise and training present that only ESU
personnel possess.
Although we believe it is commendable that the police department will ensure
that all Captains receive tactical training at the time of being promoted, this
should not supersede the skills of ESU members of the service. They are
the most qualified to handle incidents such as warrant executions and violent
emotionally disturbed persons (EDP's).
Re-focusing NYPD Drug Initiatives:
Street level narcotic enforcement plays an important role in
addressing every day quality of life crimes. It however fails to
substantially alleviate the larger burden that drugs and drug related violence
brings. The New York City Police Department must expand it drug fighting
capabilities in order to make an impact on the illegal drug trade. We
believe the following two areas can address this expansion:
Precinct SNEU teams can address the
drug offenses that take place
on the street level. This will free up the various narcotics units that
are assigned under Organize Crime Control Bureau (OCCB) to go after the larger
drug distributors. The current NYPD drug initiatives are similar to
attacking a small stream while the ocean of drugs goes for the most part
ignored. This posture will only continue to add to the ineffectiveness of
making an impact on the drug trade
and therefore placing innocent citizens in harms way. Members assigned to
OCCB have long complained that they were being under utilized by targeting small
time drug users. More emphasis must be placed on the large quantities of
drug movement in various parts of the city.
The police department initiative in
less affluent communities is commendable; however the same cannot be said for
affluent areas of the city. Based on our interviews with members assigned to
OCCB they have indicated that there is no real initiative to target those areas
where "White Collar" drug users frequent. This flies in the face
of FBI statistics that show that drug use is not limited by economic or racial
boundaries. The NYPD must do an analysis to determine if a uniform zero
tolerance strategy is being used in all communities within New York City.
It is unacceptable to use as a rationale that police enforce drug violations
only when complaints come from community residents. This sends the wrong
message that the absence of complaints mean that no enforcement will be done.
A zero tolerance with drugs means addressing dealers and users alike.
In cases where evidence has shown use among White Collar users, federal agencies
as well as the NYPD have been reluctant to go after these groups (i.e. NY Post
Wednesday, December 20, 2000).
Use of Video Cameras at Location:
It is understood that no matter how careful the police
department is, the possibility exist that mistakes will happen. In many
cases during these wrong door search warrant executions, victims complain about
how the police treat them. The use of a video camera at the location will
document what treatment a person receives from police officers as well as
protect police officers from false accusations.
Scrutiny of Confidential Informants:
All confidential informants (CI) are not alike. With
this in mind the New York City Police Department must put in place additional
steps for verifying information that comes from a C.I. that is solely motivated
by money. As it currently stands a confidential informant can obtain up to
$300.00 dollars from an investigator without obtaining approval from upper
management. This cash sum can motivate an unscrupulous informer to give
erroneous information.
The agency should also encourage more confidential tips from
the upstanding citizens in drug/crime ridden communities. This target
group's motivating factor is ridding their communities of crime and not solely
motivated by cash compensation for their information.
Ensuring that Police
Officers Are in Proper Identifiable Attire:
In many areas that search warrants are conducted the
residents have knowledge of incidents involving push-in robberies. This
makes it crucial that police personnel conduct warrants with the appropriate
N.Y.P.D. identifiable police attire on. Having a shield around an
officer's neck is not enough to be identified. Members at the scene should
be inspected to insure they are wearing Police department issued jackets and
uniforms. This also helps when confronting an immigrant or person who
speaks little English.
Medical Personnel at Scene:
A member from the
NYFD Emergency Medical Service should be present at the scene of all search
warrant executions. This will ensure that immediate attention is available
for members of the police department as well as any civilian that is injured due
to the execution of the warrant. As indicated in the Police Department's
report, FDNY had to be dispatched to the scene. They were not there from
the start.
The next area we examined is how this police commissioner’s administration
addressed the terrorist issue. We
took into account that there have been no new attacks on New York citizen or
property. It is difficult to gauge
if this is due to NYPD initiatives or the federal government homeland security
actions, because there also has not been a new attack on America’s soil.
We gave the Commissioner a plus in the area of deterrent.
Police Commissioner Kelly
has done an excellent job of changing the style of the police department
response to the various communities within New York City. He has not
however, changed the substance. His grade in this area is based on the
following items:
-Changing the tone
that the NYC Police Department communicates with NYC various communities
-Expanded Police Department
outreach to various community groups
-Unwillingness to disband quota system
-No current Deputy
Commissioner of Community Affairs
-Failure to
incorporate the “Community Policing” model into crime-fighting strategies
-Insensitive decision
to appoint DC Fyfe to head Timothy Stansbury shooting report
-No outreach to non-traditional contacts to
establish ‘official NYPD liaisons’
COMMUNITY RELATIONS BRIEFING
The wedge that
Commissioner Kelly’s administration is creating between the New York City
Police Department and the communities is not detectable without an in depth
examination. As the years progress it will be increasingly more difficult
to close the chasm with mere acknowledgements that a shooting is not justified.
On first appearance one will interpret the Commissioner's relationship with the
community of color as a good one. Although his public demeanor is not as
combative as some of the men who formally held his position, he does not support
this persona with his every day actions.
It is commendable that
this commissioner has taken the unprecedented steps of quickly acknowledging the
lack of justification of certain shootings.
This however cannot be the cornerstone of community relations.
Cosmetic improvements are not enough, substantial policy and practice
reforms need to be implemented. We
cannot ignore the crime fighting initiatives
that will have a long lasting negative impact on New York City’s
communities of color.
We
also took into account in this area the insensitive decision Commissioner Kelly
made to appoint Deputy Commissioner Fyfe to head the team that will put in place
a recommendation in response to the Timothy Stansbury shooting.
In Deputy Commissioner Fyfe’s role as head of the New York City Police
Academy, he has received several complaints from minority officers.
He also played a role in the trial surrounding the Amadou Diallo
shooting. During this trial Deputy
Commissioner Fyfe stated in essence that the officers acted properly on the day
that they shot Amadou Diallo. We
believed that the decision to appoint Fyfe to this important task showed a level
of insensitivity on the Police Commissioner’s part.
Our evaluation has taken into account the failure of the administration to establish relationships with non traditional sources. The community liaison program that exists in the Black community is nothing more than an exercise in public relations. Outside of the Black community, the liaisons are granted privilege and access. These are vital components to a respectful relationship. The NYPD needs to upgrade and standardize the manner in which liaisons are dealt with to incorporate the Black community into the dialogue about NYPD strategies and objectives.
Finally, Commissioner Kelly’s failure to appoint a Deputy Commissioner of
Community Affairs since the resignation of Deputy Commissioner Patrick, speaks
volumes about his lack of commitment in this key area.
Eric Adams
Co-Founder of 100 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care
3/04
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